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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MELANY ZOUMADAKIS,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

APPELLANT BRIEF

V.

UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL
CENTER, Et al.,
Defendants/Appellees.

App. Case No. 2004054

APPELLANT BRIEF

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to § 78-2a-3 et. seq. of the Utah Code Annotated,
in that this is a case that was transfeired from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court
of Appeals. This matter is an appeal from the Eighth Judicial District Court final order
wherein the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction pursuant to § 78-2-2(4) of the Utah
Code Annotated.
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
The District Court erred by granting appellees' Motion to Dismiss and by not
allowing appellant to conduct discovery that would support the allegations in the
Complaint. The Complaint was sufficiently plead according to Rule 8 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure and the District Court erred by dismissing appellant's claims. The
District Court also erred when it ignored appellant's request for time to amend the
complaint during oral arguments and issued its final order to dismiss before appellant
could file her Motion to Amend.
6

These issues have been reserved for appeal because a final ruling against
Appellant took effect on May 24,2004, and a timely appeal was filed on June 22,2004.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for challenging the District Court'sfindingsare reviewed
"for correctness, according them [the District Court] no particular deference." Bonham v.
Morgan. 788 P.2d 497,499 (Utah 1989). In reviewing the District Court's grant of a
motion to dismiss for correctness, the Court "must accept the factual allegations in the
complaint as true and consider all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts in a
light most favorable to the plaintiff." Ho v. Jim's Enterprises. Inc.. 29 P.3d 633,636
(Utah 2001).
The standard of review for the "denial to amend pleadings is abuse of discretion."
Kasco Services Corporation v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86,92 (Utah 1992). The "primary
consideration that a trial judge must take into account in determining whether leave
should be granted is whether the opposing side would be put to unavoidable prejudice by
having an issue adjudicated for which he had not had time to prepare." Id.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
"A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief... shall contain (1) a short plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (2) a demand for
judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled/'
Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
".. .a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of
the adverse party; and leave shall befreelygiven when justice so requires."
Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law.95
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Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution:
"All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law..."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On December 5, 2003, appellant filed a Verified Complaint claiming defamation,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and tortious interference with contract. On
January 23,2004, appellees filed a Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support
thereof, stating that appellant had failed to state a claim. Appellant replied with an
Objection to the Motion to Dismiss and appellees filed a reply memorandum. Oral
arguments were held on May 10, 2004. Appellant argued that discovery would be an
integral part of the case and that an allowance of time to amend the complaint would be
in order before dismissing the claims.
On May 24,2004, the court filed an Order granting appellees Motion to Dismiss.
The Court found that the claim for defamation was not pled with particularity and that
qualified privilege prevented the claim. On the issue of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, the court found that the claim was insufficient and that the alleged
conduct did not rise to the level required by Utah law. Finally the court found with
respect to the claim of interference with an employment contract, that there was no
contract to be enforced.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On or about June 11,1990, the appellant began her employment as a registered
nurse with appellee, Uintah Basin Medical Center (hereinafter "UBMC"). (Compl. f 5).
As far as appellant knew, she never received a negative report during her employment
with UBMC Home Healthcare. (Compl. f 6).
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On or about September 19,2003, the appellant was called into appellee, Lloyd
Nielson's (hereinafter "Nielson"), office and was told that there have been numerous
complaints by appellee, Dr. Marie Mason (hereinafter "Mason"), against appellant.
(CompL f 7). The specific complaints by Mason included that the appellant was telling
patients that Mason was ordering wrong tilings, that Mason was giving improper care,
and that appellant smelled of alcohol as complained of by an unsolicited patient. (CompL
f 8). According to appellant's received information and belief, appellee, Carolyn Smith
(hereinafter "Smith"), misrepresented to Mason that appellant was questioning his care.
(CompL f9).
Without any research into these allegations, Nielson wrote a disciplinary action
subjecting appellant to alcohol and drug screens, a communications class, denial of
appellant to speak with Mason's patients, and denial of appellant to speak with any
patient or doctor about various treatments. (CompL f 10). These restrictions on appellant
would make it impossible for her to follow her general duties as a registered nurse(CompL f l l ) .
During this meeting with Nielson, appellant was asked to sign a disciplinary
action form . Appellant would not sign the disciplinary action form, and requested to take
it home, review it, and make proper suggestions with her attorney. When appellant would
not sign the form Nielson fired her. Due to thisfiring,appellant lost her long term sick
leave, medical benefits, life insurance, retirement benefits, wages, and her job. (CompL f
14.)
Appellant claims that Nielson defamed her by adding untrue reports to her
employment file, told the Department of Workforce Services that she quit and was not
fired, and misstated that appellant's professionalism and work history which affected her
ability to keep her job, or to obtain future work. (CompL f 36).
9

According to appellant's information and belief, the disciplinary action came as a
result of libel, slanderous, patently false, and fraudulent misrepresentations by appellees
Nielson, Mason, Smith, and/or other John Does. (Compl. f 12). According to appellant,
she believes that appellees did nothing to confirm or corroborate the allegations against
the appellant. (Compl. f 13).
Appellant filed her complaint against appellees on December 5,2003. Appellees
then filed its Motion to Dismiss on February 18,2004. Appellant replied in an Objection
to the Motion to Dismiss on February 24,2004 and then filed a request for oral argument.
(Docketing Statement f S). At the oral argument appellant repeatedly stated that
dismissal without discovery would be unfair. (Tr. at 11,12,13,20,21). As well,
appellant asked the court for the time allowed to amend the complaint before considering
dismissal. (Tr. at 18). The District Court filed its Order granting appellees' Motion to
Dismiss.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant's claims of defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
tortious interference with employment contract were all sufficiently plead in her Verified
Complaint. The District Court erred when the granted appellees Motion to Dismiss. This
case was dismissed without allowing appellant to participate in any discovery or amend
the complaint. Appellant requests that this Order by the District Court should be
remanded so appellant can conduct necessary discovery regarding her case because the
Complaint contained sufficient statements of claims. As well, appellant requests that this
case be remanded so that appellant can have time to submit a Motion to Amend the
Complaint to plead her claims with more particularity.
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ARGUMENT
L

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY DISMISSING THE CASE
BECAUSE APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT WAS PLEAD WITH
PARTICULARITY TO SURVIVE A MOTION TO DISMISS.
The District Court erred by granting the Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a

claim because appellant's complaint was sufficient to allow this case to continue into
discovery. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "restrict the pleadings to the task of
general notioe-giving and invest the deposition-discovery process with the vital role in the
preparation for trial." Williams vt State Farm Insurance Company, 656 P.2d 966,970
(Utah 1982), citing Blackfaam v, Saelgrove, 280 PJ2d453,455 (Utah 1955). The
Williams Court goes on to state that "a complaint is required only to ... give the opposing
parly fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication
of the type of litigation involved." Id. Appellant did file a complaint that was sufficient
to give notice of the claims and an indication of the type of litigation involved. The
following arguments will outline the claims in the complaint and why they should have
withstood the Motion to Dismiss.
A.

APPELLANT HAD A VIABLE CAUSE OF ACTION IN
DEFAMATION AGAINST APPELLEES.
In appellant's Complaint it states that appellees published falsehoods of appellant

to other employees and to the Etepartment of WoddTorce Services. These falsehoods were
clearly listed as "specific complaints by Mason included that the [appellant] was telling
patients that Mason was ordering wrong things, that Mason was giving improper care,
and that the [appellant] smelled of alcohol as complained of by an unsolicited patient."
Compl. % 8. Due to these defamatory statements appellant has lost her job with UBMC,
cannotfindnew employment, and is in danger of losing her home.
11

The District Court in its Order granting the Motion to Dismiss stated that
appellant's claim for defamation was not plead with particularity and that the general
statements referred to in the Complaint do not inform the defendants when, where, and
whom the statements were made by. However, in Williams, the Court stated that "a
complaint for defamation must set forth 'the language complained of... in words or
words to that effect/" 656 R2d 966, 970 (Utah 1982). The Williams Court stated that
statements such as "annoy, threaten, and intimidate" or "derogatory and libelous
statements" are insufficient. Id. However, in the case at bar, appellant has plead in
"words to that effect,9' the untrue statements of the appellees. The defamatory statements
that appellant plead in her Complaint were plead with enough particularity to survive a
Motion to Dismiss and to continue on to the discovery process.
The District Court also found that the defamation claim could be dismissed
because the statements were subject to qualified privilege.

"If qualified privilege exists,

the burden is on the plaintiff to prove that the privilege was abused. The plaintiff can
show abuse of the privilege by proving that the defendant acted with malice or that the
publication of the defamatory material extended beyond those who had a legally justified
reason for receiving it." Brehany v. Nordstrom, 812 P.2d 49, 58 (Utah 1991). Appellant
would hope to prove with discovery, even though the defamatory statements made by
Mason, Smith, and Nielson may be protected by qualified privilege, that possible
statements made to Workforce Services would be publishing of the defamatory
statements. Appellant argues that discovery is needed to obtain her employment file and
her Department of Workforce Services file to substantiate how far the defamatory
statements have been spread. However, even if Workforce Services would be considered
a legitimately interested recipient or third-party and covered by qualified privilege, the
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District Court could have allowed appellant time to file a Motion to Amend to include in
her defamation claim that appellees acted with malice. Once the Complaint was amended
with the facts showing appellees acted with malice, then the defamation claim would
stand the challenge of qualified privilege.
Therefore, the District Court should have denied the Motion to Dismiss and
allowed appellant to either seek discovery of her employment file and her Department of
Workforce Services file, or allow appellant time to file a Motion to Amend the Complaint
to add facts to her defamation claim to show appellees acted with malice.
B.

APPELLANT'S CLAIM OF INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL ©ISTRESS IS A VIABLE CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST APPELLEES.
Appellant has been suffering from severe emotion distress since hearing the

defamatory statements by Mason, Smith, and Nielson. In order for a claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress to survive it must be "so extreme and outrageous as to
permit recovery/' Walter v. Stewart 67 P3d 1042, 1048 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). The
level of distress must "rise to a level that "no reasonable [person] could be expected to
endure." Id- at 1049. The conduct of the tortfeasor should be "atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community." Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d
949,977-78 (Utah 1992). The Walter Court stated that these elements are "each
questions of law for the court to detennine, in the first instance." 67 P3d 1042,1048.
Appellant believes the District Court erred when it held that appellant's claim of
intentional emotional distress was insufficient because it did "not rise to the level
required by Utah law." The District Court also stated that case law "indicates mere
termination is not sufficient to constitute outrageous conduct as required for a valid"
claim. (Order, May 24,2004).
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Appellant disagrees with the District Court because the defamatory comments in
combination with her being fired caused appellant to suffer severe emotional distress.
Appellant was told of complaints stating she was telling patients that Mason was ordering
wrong things, that Mason was giving improper care, and that the appellant smelled of
alcohol that was complained of by an unsolicited patient. After over 13 years of working
with UBMC and having an exemplary work record, appellant was devastated with these
complaints. In addition to these defamatory comments, which appellant maintains are
completely false, appellant was forced to either sign a disciplinary action form or be
terminated. Appellant disagreeing with the false statements recorded on the form, refused
to sign the disciplinary action form, resulting in her termination.
These events that occurred severely effected appellant. Appellant has been
receiving counseling and is on medication due to the emotion distress she has suffered.
In addition, appellant is horribly embarrassed from the statements made and is anxious
and fearful of the bad reputation these comments have inflicted. Appellant's ability to
find a job due to these defamatory comments has been hindered and this causes additional
emotional distress.
Appellant requests that the Court remand this claim back to the District Court so
through the discovery process, appellant can further prove the defamatory statements and
who they have been published to. These facts will come to light with the ability to
discover appellant's employment file and her file with Workforce Services. Appellant
further argues from the statements above that her intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim does rise to the level of "atrocious and utterly intolerable conduct" because
she was not merely terminated, she was defamed by her co-workers and subjected to a
forced termination because she would not agree with the defamatory statements alleged.
Therefore, appellant's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim should be
14

remanded back to the District Court because there were sufficient facts stated to support
the claim and to survive a Motion to Dismiss.
C

APPELLANTS CLAIM FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH

EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT WOULD NOT STAND AS A SUFFICIENT CAUSE
OF ACTION, HOWEVER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY NOT
ALLOWING APPELLANT TIME TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT.
Appellant claimed tortious interference with employment contract in the
Complaint. The Complaint truthfully stated that appellees all contributed to the
defamatory statements made against appellant, which led to appellants termination from
Jber employment and which has made it impossible for her to obtain comparable
employment Appellant also argued that appellees had breached their procedure by not
following the fonnal grievance procedure in the Employee Handbook. However,
appellant now admits that no contract of employment existed between her and UBMC,
due to that it was considered employment at-will and was so stated in the Employee
Handbook and Employee Acknowledgement form.
In now admitting that appellant had made a mistake in the claim asserted,
appellant feels that because it was requested in the Oral Argument that appellant should
have been allowed time to amend the Complaint before a Motion to Dismiss would be
considered. Appellant requests this Court to remand this case back to the District Court
to allow appellant time to file a Motion to Amend her Complaint.
If appellant is allowed time to amend her Complaint, appellant would be able to
amend the claim of tortious interference with employment contract, to the correct claim
of wrongful discharge. Along with this amended claim appellant would state supporting
facts that show appellees wanted appellant terminated because appellant keep meticulous
records and had a zealous desire to follow all state laws and regulations regarding the
15

treatment of patients. Appellant would show in an amended complaint and through
discovery that appellees wanted appellant terminated so they could contravene
enforceable professional ethical obligations.
Therefore, based on the above arguments appellant requests that this Court
remand this case back to the District Court to allow appellant time to amend this claim in
the Complaint. The arguments below will also show support for appellant's request to
amend the Complaint.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY NOT ALLOWING
APPELLANT TIME TO FILE A MOTION TO AMEND
COMPLAINT BEFORE CONSIDERING A MOTION TO DISMISS.
The District Court erred when it ignored appellant's request during oral arguments

for time to amend the Complaint. Appellant clearly states on the record that "a Motion to
Dismiss would be improper at this time and allowance for an amended complaint would
be in order." (Tr. at 18). In granting the Motion to Dismiss, the District Court did not
allow any time for appellant to file a Motion to Amend the Complaint.
"The standard of review of a denial to amend pleadings is abuse of discretion."
Kasco Services Corporation. 831 P.2d 86, 92 (Utah 1992), citing Cheney v. Rucker. 381
P.2d 86,91 (Utah 1963). Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, "a party
may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party;
and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." (2004). When a trial judge is
determining whether a leave should be granted, the judge must consider "whether the
opposing side would be put to unavoidable prejudice by having an issue adjudicated for
which he had not had time to prepare." Kasco Services Corporation, 831 P.2d 86,92
(Utah 1992), citing Bekks Bar V Ranch v, Huth, 664 P.2d 455,464 (Utah 1983).
In the case at bar, the District Court did not allow appellant the time necessary to
file a Motion to Amend before dismissing the case. Rule 15(a) states that a leave to
16

amend should be "fteely given when justice so requires." It would have been more just to
grant appellant time to file a Motion to Amend than to take the chosen course of action in
dismissing the case with prejudice. Appellant requests this Court to remand this case
back to the District Court, so that appellant can file a Motion to Amend the Complaint.
If remanded back to the District Court, appellant would be able to properly file a
Motion to Amend accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities in support,
and a proposed amended complaint See Holmes Development LLC v. Cook, 48 P3d
895,909-10 (Utah 2002). When a court is determining whether to grant or deny a motion
to amend, "Utah courts have focused on three factors: the timeliness of the motion; the
justification given by the movant for the delay; and the resulting prejudice to the
responding party." Kelly v, Hard Money Funding, Inc», 87 P3d 734,742 (Utah Ct App.
2004).
If appellant was given the time to file a Motion to Amend it would have been
considered timely because the case had not reached the advanced stages of the litigation
process. At the point of dismissal, appellees had notfiledan Answer, therefore, an
amended complaint would not have prejudiced the appellees because they would have
ample time to prepare for any amended issues. Appellant's following arguments will
support the request that this Court remand this case back to the District Court to allow
appellant to file a Motion to Amend.
A.

APPELLANT IS JUSTIFIED IN FILING A MOTION TO AMEND

BECAUSE APPELLEES USED QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE AS AN
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE.
Appellant would be justified in filing a Motion to Amend because appellees
asserted qualified privilege as an affiimative defense. Appellant did not predict the
defense of qualified privilege when drafting the Complaint, but once appellees asserted
17

qualified privilege as an affirmative defense, it is up to appellant to show "abuse of the
privilege by proving that the defendant acted with malice or that the publication of the
defamatory material extended beyond those who had a legally justified reason for
receiving i t " Brehany. 812 P.2d 49, 58.
Appellant should be allowed to file a Motion to Amend because appellant can
assert that appellees acted with malice when defaming appellant, which led to appellant's
termination. In an amended complaint appellant would assert the qualified privilege that
protects communications between Nielson, Smith, and Mason, was transcended by the
appellees acting with malice. Appellant would assert that Mason and Smith published the
defamatory statements about appellant because they were concerned with appellant's
meticulous records and zealous desire to follow all state laws and regulations regarding
the treatment and care of patients. Appellant was not going to attempt to "blow the
whistle" on appellees for fear that appellees would terminate her if she did, however,
appellees maliciously defamed appellant which led to her termination.
In addition to Smith and Mason's actions toward appellant, Nielson also had
malicious intentions for terminating appellant. Appellant argues that Nielson wanted her
terminated because she was a threat to his job. Appellant asserts that shortly before her
termination took place, she made a suggestion to Nielson about creating a wound-care
unit in the place of a conference room. When Nielson heard this suggestion, appellant
states that Nielson became irate and told appellant "he would handle it." (Objection to
Dismiss).
These incidents in combination with several others form the argument that
appellees were malicious in making the defamatory statements which led to appellant's
termination. These malicious actions are even more pronounced, if appellant in her
amended complaint shows her exemplary work history and glowing recommendations.
18

Therefore, appellant requests that this Court remand this case back to the District
Court, to allow appellant to file a Motion to Amend. Appellant did not know that a
qualified privilege defense would be asserted and requests an opportunity to amend the
compliant with die facts that support the argument that appellees were malicious in their
defamatory statements which transcends the protection of qualified privilege.
B.

APPEIXANTISJUSTfl^DINFHLJNGAMOTfONTOAMEND

BECAUSE APPELLANT WAS MISTAKEN AS TO HER CLAIM FOR
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT.
Appellant requests this Court to remand this case back to the District Court, so
appellant can make a Motion to Amend, to amend her third cause of action. Appellant
explained above in Argument 1(C) that she was mistaken in claiming the grievance
procedure in the Employee Handbook created a contract between appellant and UBMC.
In learning that the UBMC Employee Handbook discounts all arguments of contractual
employment, and instead supports appellees' employment-at-will stance, appellant would
have made a Motion to Amend the complaint to claim wrongful discharge.
Under the claim for wrongful discharge appellant would pursue that appellees
termination of appellant was a "violation of a clear and substantial public policy."
Hansen v. America Online, Inc.T 96 P3d 950, 952 (Utah 2004). "An employee's
discharge for a reason that contravenes a clear and substantial public policy givesriseto a
cause of action in tort" Id* An employer should not "exploit the employment
relationship by demanding that an employee choose between continued employment and
violating a law or failing to perform a public obligation of clear and substantial import,"
Id,
In the case at bar, appellant felt that herterminationand the defamatory comments
made by Mason, Smith, and Nielson, ensued from appellees concern that appellant
19

followed the rules and regulations of her profession too carefully. As stated in the
argument above, appellant suspects that appellees pursued her termination because they
were afraid that appellant would "blow the whistle."
By being allowed to file a Motion to Amend, appellant would be able to assert the
wrongful discharge claim and list the supporting facts that show appellant was discharged
to contravene professional and ethical standards.
Appellant requests that this Court remand this case, to allow appellant the
opportunity to file a Motion to Amend, so appellant can claim wrongful discharge.
CONCLUSION
Appellant maintains that her case was dismissed in error and that her claims of
defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress were plead with enough
particularity to give appellees notice of the nature and basis of the claims. As well,
appellant argues that the District Court erred by not giving appellant time to file a Motion
to Amend before dismissing this case.
In conclusion, appellant respectfully requests that the District Court's ruling
dismissing her case is reversed, and under the direction of this Court find that the original
Complaint was plead sufficiently on the claims of defamation and intentional infliction of
emotional distress, or to allow appellant time to file a Motion to Amend the Complaint.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ ^ d a y of November, 2004.
KESSLER LAW OFFICE

Kessler, Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this
day of November, 2004,1 hand-delivered two
copies of the foregoing Appellant Brief to the following:
Carolyn Cox, Esq.
Attorney for Appellees
Holme, Roberts & Owen, LLP
299 South Main Street
Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2263
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ADDENDUM
CONTENTS OF ADDENDUM
1. Plaintiffs Complaint
2. Defendants' Answer
3. Defendant's Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss with
attached Affidavits
4. Plaintiff's Objection to motion to Dismiss with attached Affidavits
5. Defendant's Reply Brief to Motion to Dismiss
6. Eighth District Court's Order Dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint.
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FILED
DISTRICT COURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH

DEC 0 5 2003
McKEE, CLERK

Jay L.Kessler (8550)

DEPUTY

KESSLER LAW OFFICE
Attorney for Melany Zoumadakis
9117 West 2700 South, #A
Magna, Utah 84044
Telephone: (801) 252-1400
Facsimile: (801) 252-1401
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MELANY ZOUMADAKIS,
Plaintiff.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT

v.
UNTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER, INC., and
individuals DR. MARK MASON, LLOYD
NIELSON, CAROLYN SMITH, and JOHN
DOES 1-10.
Defendants.

judge jR. ftnderoon
CaseNo. 0 3 0 8 0 0 0 2 5

COME NOW the Plaintiff, and for causes of action against the Defendants,
allege as follows:
JURISDICTION, VENUE, AMO THE PARTIES
1. At the time of the mciefent giving rise to this cause of acfcon, trie Pfarnfrr? antf
Defendants resio'edVn Oudhesne County, State of 'OteirT
2. The incident giving rise to this cause of action occurred in Duchesne County,
State of Utah.

3. Jurisdiction is proper in this court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§78=3-4(1).
4. Venue is proper in this court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-13-7.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
5. On or about Junet 1990, the Pfeintiff began her employment as a registered
nurse with Defendant Uintah Basin Medrcaf Center witfi Home Beaffhcare (hereinafter
UBMG).
6. As far as the Plaintiff ever knew, she never received a negative report at her
employment with UMBC Home Healthcare,
7. On or about September 19, 2003, the Plawfiff was called into Defendant
Lloyd Nielsen's, (hereinafter Mielson) office and told that there have been numerous
complaints by Defendant Dr. Mason, (hereinafter Mason) against the Plaintiff,
8.

The specific complaints by Mason included that the Plaintiff was teffing

patients that Mason was ordering wrong things, that Mason was giving improper care.,
and that the Plaintiff smeiied of alcohol as complained of by an unsolicited patient
9. According to information and belief, Defendant Smith (hereinafter Smrth), also
misrepresented to Mason that the Plaintiff was questioning his care.
10. Without any research Into the allegations whatsoever, Ntefson wrote a
disciplinary action subjecting the Pfainffff to aicohol m$ drug screens, a
communications c\a$s, &eni&\ of the Plaintiff to speak with Mason's patients, denial of
the PlaVnWf to speak wrui any patient or doctor about varfous treatment
11. The abow-listerf TBsthcAicms would have been Impossible *o foffow under ih&
Plaintiffs general dyftes a& a registered nurse<
12. The disciplinary actton came as a result of libel, slanderous, paiesgfy fefee,
and fraudulent ailsreprsseri^atfons by Defendants' Nielson, Mason, Smith, and/or other
John Does.
2

13. The Defendants did nothing to confirm or corroborate the allegations against
the Plaintiff.
14. When the Plarntiff would not sign the disciplinary action form, and requested
to take it home, review it, and make proper suggestions with her attorney, Nielson fired
her, and the Plaintiff tost long term $?cr& teavef medica/ benefits, fife insurance,
retirement benefits, wages, a?K% her job.
15. All of the complaints against the Plaintiff were patently false, defamed her
character, and have jeopardized her career
16. Before being fired, the Plaintiff tried to talk to Mason, but was told by Niefson
that if she talked to anyone about the disciplinary action she would be terminated.
17. The Plaintiff wrote a letter to Mason, gave it to Niefson to give to Mason, and
Nielson refused to give rt to Mason and would not return the letter to the Plaintiff,
18. Nielsen's disciplinary report incorrectly states that the Plaintiff has been
warned on many occasions regarding her behavior, when in reality, the Plaintiff has had
an exemplary work history.
19. The Piafnfrft "has tiietf to communicate wfth a\i of fne peopfe Involved in this
matter hut has keen re&uffetf at every turn.
20. In order to preserve their rights the Plaintiffs have hired present counsel &n6
filed this lawsuit.

3

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
LIBEL AND SLANDER (against all Defendants)
21. The Plaintiff Incorporates herein by this reference paragraphs 1 through 20 of
this Complaint
22. The Defendants had an affirmative duty to speak and/or write the truth about
the actions and professionalism of the Plaintiff ^i all tirnea relative to tier work,
23. The Defendants breached tfiis tiuiy by spreading falsehoods by either the
spoken wsrd of through writings sfartfr*g that the Plaintiff s m i l e d of a\mho\ wfete on the
job, that the Plaintrff questioned Mason's care for patients, and that the Plaintiff had
r?ur?fer&tt& Kegstitm f&pzrts o?x b&r eTOj&bymant ?scsr&,
24. Tb&t ifte Qefervia&ds' snafetous &ea&h o* tfeek cfetfy to speak and ~*%dte fee
truth about the Plaintiff rises to the level of libel and slander.
25. That due to the Defendants5 libef and slander against the Plaintiff, the
Plaintiff has lost her job with Uintah Basin Media! Center, is suffering severe emotional
and psychological depression arid stress, cannot find new employment, and is in
danger of losing her home.
26. That as a result of the Defendants5 libel and slander against the Plaintiff, the
Plaintiff has suffered fosses of and is entitled to: at feast $200,000.00 in present and
future lost wages; pain and" suffering; punitive damages pursuant to §78-18-1 of the
Utah Code Annotated, because of the Defendant's w$fuf, maficfous, and/or inferrttonafJy
fraudulent conduct In this matter; plus court costs, attorney's fees, interest and
expenses.

4

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF B/tOTfOMAL DISTRESS(Afi Defendants)
£7. The Plaintiff incorporates herein by this reference paragraphs 1 through 28
of this Complaint
28- The Defendants kne*# and wiiffuliy subjected the Plaintiff to emotional
distress by Jyio/3 about hBT work activities., pjofessionafom, and/or employment record.
29. The Defendants subjected the Plaintiff to the aforesaid emotional distress
specifically for the purpose of terminating her employment.
30. The Plaintiff has been receiving counseling and \s on medication for the
emotional distress the Defendants subjected her to.
31. Due to the Defendant's Intentional InfUetiorr of Emotional Distress upon the
Plaintiff, the Plaintiff is entitled to recover her compensatory damages which loci Licfe *
loss of wages, all medical, prescription, and psychiatricfofftsretetedto the ernotionaf
distress, and an amount in punrtrve damages and pain and suffering to be determined
at trial in this matter, plus interest, costs, expenses and attorney's fees,
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH EMPLOYMENT (AH Defendants*}
{32. The Plaintiff incorporates herein by this reference paragraphs 1 through 31
of this Complaint
33. Each of the Defendants in this matter contributed to the false allegations
against the Pfarntrff which fed to frer being termrnated from her emptoytnent, and
makmg it rmpossifcte for rter to obtain comparable employment

5

34. According to information and belief, Defendant Smith, misrepresented and
slandered the Plaintiffs conversation about Reason to Defendant Mason.
35. According to information and belief, Defendant Mason slandered the plaintiff
by stating to Deferidant Nfelson that the Piaiiitiff questioned his care, and smelted of
afcohoi.
36. Defendant Nielsen slandered and libeled the Plaintiff by askting unfme
/•^p^rts .vi ^tera&^cj'iVfbTrt£*le, t<?,W ttw De^rim&Kt&f

x

Na*ki&?c& S&rtsces tteak*&7&

P\aintiff qu& and w&% n&t ftced, and misstated the Plaintiffs professionalism &nd work
history thereby affecting her ahiltiv keept he? job o? ta obtain, future work..
37. Due to the Defendants' Tortious interference with employment, the Plaintiff
has suffered iosses of and is entitled to: at least $200,000. DO in .present and future lost
wages; pain and suffering; punitive damages pursuant to §78-18-1 of the Utah Code
Annotated, because of the Defendants willful, malicious, &n&fQ? intentionally fraudulent
conduct in this matter; plus court costs, attorney's fees, interest and expenses,
PRATER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, ttse Plamfrffs pray for reffet against tfie Defendant as feftows:
a) Rret Cause of Action; Slander and Libel, Vn ffie amount of aft least
$20Q,0QQ.©& in pwsent and fa/tore IDS* wages; pain and suffering; punitwe tfamages
pAus&arftfe?§TB= ?S-4i of I t e lAfeh Cc^fe Anra&fe&f* because *s#feeDe&wda&tiS W8&&1,
matiGAGM&i %nd/ofi \nter&Kx&frf'%rau&di3& €&ffufoc& in Svs, ma%&r; pte& c&tyA osste,
attanie/sfee%,Merest 3&& e*go&ftS£s.

6

b) Second Cause of Action; intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: the
Plaintiff is entitled to recover her campensatory damages wtiich Include: loss of wages,
art' meaYcal, prescription, and psychiatric bitts refeted to the emotional distress, and an
amount in 'punfttve damages &n& paVn and suffering to toe determined at trial in this
matter, plus irftensst, casts, expemes and attorney's fees.
c) Third Cat/se of/Ac&on, Torlvows Irteriferersee wtf? Empiaytrm^t, VT» tfee ^nnotirft
c£ $200,000.00 in present »\cF fufessre }csg& w^ges; pass* a i d SL#esvrrgv p^rr&^eda^a&ja?
pursuant to §7B=18-? of ihe Utafr Code Annotated, because of the Defendant's willful,
malicious, a#d/or intentianalfy ftaudutent caociuct in this matter; plus, court, costs,
attorney's fees., interest and e^oenses,
DATED this / ^

day of November, 2003.
KESSLER i A W OFFICE

^

^

-

Jay y. Kessier, Counsel for Plaintiff

7

. —

DATED this / V day of November, 2003.

MelajryS^oumaci'

STATE OF UTAH

)

ss

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Melany Zoumadakis, on this / ^ day of November, 2003, being first duly
sworn and under oath, deposes and says that she is the Plaintiff in the above-entitled
action; that she has read the foregoing Verified Complaint and understands the
contents thereof, and the same is true and acceptable of her own knowledge.
"2^

/' t.i

Notary Public
SERVE:
Uintah Basin Medical Center, Inc.
c/o Bradley D. LeBaron, Registered agent
250 West 300 North
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
Lloyd Nielson
Uintah Basin Medical Center, Inc.
250 West 300 North
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
Dr. Mark Mason
Uintah Basin Medical Center, Inc.
250 West 300 North
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
Carolyn Smith
Uintah Basin Medical Center, Inc.
250 West 300 North
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
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HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP
Blaine J. Benard, #5661
Carolyn Cox, #4816
299 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2263
Telephone: (801)323-5800
Facsimile: (801)521-9639

Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF DUCHESNE
MOTION TO DISMISS

MELANY ZOUMADAKIS,

Case No. 030800083

Plaintiff

Judge John R. Anderson

v.
UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER, INC.,
and individuals DR. MARK MASON,
LLOYD NIELSON, CAROLYN SMITH, and
JOHN DOES 1-10,

HEARING REQUESTED

Defendant

Defendants Uintah Basin Medical Center, Inc., Dr. Mark Mason, Lloyd Nielson and
!

Carolyn Smith, by their counsel and pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), move to dismiss the
complaint of plaintiff Melany Zoumadakis in its entirety and with prejudice for failure to state a
claim. This Motion is supported by a Memorandum in Support filed herewith. Defendants also
request a hearing on this Motion pursuant to Rule 7 (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this ^2?

day of January, 2004.
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP
CAROLYN COX
299 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2263
Attorneys for Defendants

#160812 vl

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this '---- ""day of January, 2004, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS was served by U.S. mail, postage
prepaid, as follows:

JAY L. KESSLER
9117 West 2700 South #A
Magna, Utah 84044

^

^ ^Q ^

2
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^

^ ^

f

.

^

^^

/

HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP
Blaine J. Benard, #5661
Carolyn Cox, #4816
Brittany J. Nelson, #9937
299 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2263
Telephone: (801)323-5800
Facsimile: (801)521-9639
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE HIGH 111 JUDICIAL D1SIR1C 1 COUR1
STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF DUCHESNE
MELANY ZOUMADAKIS,
Plaintiff
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPOR1 OF
MOTION TO DISMISS

v.
UIN 1 ,\i l HAhiN MEDICAL CENTER, iiv
and individuals DR. MARK MASON,
LLOYD NIELSON, CAROLYN SMITH, am.
JOHN DOES 1-10,

C;is, \\> n"()S(i(»()S N
Judge John R. Anderson

DEFENDANT

Defendants Uintah Basin Medical Center, Inc., Dr. Mark Mason, Lloyd Nielson and
Carolyn Smith, by their counsel, respectfully submit this Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismi-

f •" M - I i i

i nitii,id,it

'.!• ,1 I- '.

complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and should be dismissed, in its
cull'.

#160788 vl

s i u i ' i y i - N i Mi. 11

1.

is

Plaintiff Melany Zoumadakis (tcMs. Zoumadakis") was employed by Uintah

Basin as a home health nurse in its home health department from appro\imaie]_
ihrouiji ..:i.l-S:ntl.ml-..T',|fHr
2.

,

* l

(YmiDlaint1fl|5, 14.

Defendant Uintah Basin Medical Center ("Uintah Basin") is a small rural hospital

located in Roo^ w.n
3.

Defendant Dr. Mark Mason is a doctor who provides services to Uintah Basin

pursuant to a contract, undji
4.

.•.-.*>.i ,i-i.i.m.u^.-i >i

u

* ?.

Defendant Lloyd Nielson is employed by Uintah Basm as the director of I hntah

Basin's home health department, in wind u ole he supervised M, . zoumadakis «' «nin|>l mil Y\\ \
10.
5.

Defendant Carolyn Smith is employed In i mm. i*asin and serves i\>. i n .\ia

medical assisliuit \ ' unplainl )\ 9
6.

• .

In this action, Ms. Zoumadakis claims that defendants defamed her. The specific

allegations of defan latoi > • : c i m lit n licatioi is inch ide:
a.
questioned his care of
b.

a statement by Ms. Smith to Dr. Mason tllat Ms. Zoumadakis had
u- = »..
complaints by Dr. Mason to Mr. Nielson that Ms. Zoumadakis was telling

Dr. Mason's patients that he had ordered the wrong treatment and was givii lg impi opei cai e, ai i,c 1
that a patient c .omplaine d t 3 Di Mason that Ms. Zoumadakis smelled of alcohol, Complaint ^j 8;

2
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c.

a written disciplinary repnri bv Mr. Nielson that addressed the above complaints

by Dr. Mason. Complaint f 18.
7.

A- .

<•**•

•' • -:i- ; '' - • ' v- •"

1 leges a claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress. In support of that claim, Ms. Zoumadakis alleges that the
( ci':nu.mls

:

,!

, ih.ih .;. :

•

"

^-n

1

• n !. l .:iaph o

•

above. Complaint 11 >•
8.

Ms./.uiiiuadaK.., i in;U . ause ui .wu-.-n ,i : :,!.,

.ain

'

:!iiu ferena-

with employment. In support of that claim, Ms. Zoumadakis alleges that defendants interfered
with her employment by Uintah Basin by making the statements outlined in paragraph 6 above.
C( )i i lpl. in it. f1'[33 36
ARGUMENT
I.

MS. ZUUMADAKIS'I Ill S I C X I JSE OF \ CTION ALLEGING DEFAMATION
MUST BE DISMISSED
In her first cause ol .K ii^ii. ;MN. ,.i ..-.;i., .:K» . •

-.ukmuii

'•

u-;.njnts

of a claim for defamation include (1) that defendants published statements conceming plaintiff;
(2) such statements were false, defamatory and not subject to any privilege, ^ ) sucti statements
were published with the requisite degree of fault; and (4) their publication resulted in damage.
West R Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1007 (Utah 1994), Ms. Zoumadakis' defamation
(!••-'•

..-M-., \ m ..iiKViiKri!),!, " !. ' * • P! ..'•

»,

• ith/, k-. -iau* particularity; (2)

to the extent she identifies defamatory statements, such statements are subject to a qualified
pi ivilege; and (3) as to defei idai it I Nielson, the defamatoi y staten lents atti ibi iteci to ! in :i i v /€ i e not
published.

3
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A.

Ms. Z o u m a d a k i s ' Defamation Ciaiiu Is Not VU-tl With Particularity As
Required R\ Rule 9 and I herefore II Mu^t Be Dismissed

Thiokol Inr 70ft F.Supp 795, 799-800 (D.Utah 1988); Williams v. State Far™ 7>w. Co., 656
1' Ai vi .(>,

"o meet this requirement, a plaii itiff n lust identify the defai natoi y

statement either by its "words or words to that effect;" general statements characterizing the
defamatory words are inadequate. Id. Courts have also required that the complaint allege when,
'•'•

WVIIMV

.!• • ' li i.\m-•-

'

statement was made. Boisjoly, 706 F.Supp. at 800.

This level of specificity is required so that the court can determine if the complained of statement

Applying the above standards, Ms. Zoumadakis' Complaint fails to state a claim for
defamation

.. .

. / uiiKiuatj

M

m. --c^s L',UK-J.<

t-

«M

^Uii. IIK -!i

IK

identify when and where such statements were allegedly made. Complaint, ^ | 8, 9 and 18.
i

•

Thus, Ms. Zoumadakis' first cause of action must be dismissed.
B.

M s . Zoumadakis' Defamation Claim Must Be Dismissed Because T o T h e
Extent Defamatory Statements A r e Adequately Alleged, They Are Subject
To A Qualified Privilege

The law has long recognized that a publication is conditionally privileged if it is made to
protect a legitimate interest of the publisher. Brehany v. Nordstrom, 812 P.2d 49, 59 (Utah
uc.d-(i.\

i.J , :, A Viitrni, i,, ,.' -

*. t .

Icritim-\x *. :nr ion interest

between the publisher and the recipient of the publication. Id, at 58; Lind v. Lynch, 665 P.2d
12 ; 5. 12 ; '8(1 Ital i 1/983) I lei e, at I: >c: st, Ms Z< n u i m 1; ikis i ilk g< lit \i it Ms. Sr nth. Di: M; i: son's
medical assistant, made a defamatory statement to Dr. Mason regarding Ms. Zoumadakis'

4
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interaction with Dr. Mason's patients; that Dr. Mason complained about Ms. Zoumadakis'
interaction with his patients, and also reported a patient compiami rcyaruniLi M: / <>.IJM.:.MKJ^ U>
Mr. Nielson, head of Uintah Basin's home health division and Ms. Zoumadakis' supervisor, and
that Mr. Nielson prepared a written disciplinary action based on those statements.
1\ *

*, • « u ,

•

n. Mason's statements to Mr. Nielson are

subject to a qualified privilege and therefore cannot constitute defamation. Ms. Smith works for
j M .Mi^Ml

I.

! !

Hit

'•

'i . t . v

.iam

.\^

.

.*

.

»iUt i v ^ t

in the welfare of the patients seem by Dr. Mason. Statements by Ms. Smith to Dr. Mason
regarding Ms. Zoumadakis 5 interaction •*•....:.. . -:

i

:

i - a-

that common interest.
|

Similarly, given that Dr. Mason is under contract with «;.*; pro\ uies services to - unah

Basil i I ic has a cc

teiest with "Uintah Basin. This interest is furthered by the fact that

Uintah Basin's home health division provides care to Dr. Mason's patients. Again, statements
j

i

• • , • j [»

• __

thh division and directly

supervises Ms. Zoumadakis, regarding Ms. Zoumadakis' performance of her home health duties
.K

. and t»w '••! -•

*.x .. <

Because the alleged defamatory statements fall within the qualified privilege, dismissal of
Ms. Zoumadakis uuamai.i/.. tu;... .
C.

.n-iiiiiiii.

Ms. Zoumadakis' Defamation Claim Must Be Dismissed" As Against
Defendant Lloyd Nielson Because Ms. Zoumadakis Fails to Allege
Publication

Ms. Zoumadakis' defamation claim as against Nielson rests on a disciplinary report
prepared by Mr, Nielson and presented to Ms. Zoumadakis that contained Dr. Mason's
5
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complaints and concerns about Ms. Zoumadakis. To make out a claim for defamation, Ms.
Zoumadakis must demonstrate

.:;c ^iicgcu^. UL-iauwumy sl.ilnm ml 11 i 1IM ulr i ipliniirs

report) was published to third parties. DeBry v. Godbe, 992 P.2d 979, 985 (( Hah 1999) ("the
i

requirement of publication means that the defamatory statement must be co;.un .: i .n .*
J>CJ -«»?.

?

d

reads and understands the statement"). However, Ms.

Zoumadakis alleges only that Mr. Nielson showed her the disciplinary report; she does not allege
lli.il f.li Mi. I'.iin iniliirJH .1 III. ihwipliihir, ira|n111 (if JIT1,, flnnl |Mitv Because she has failed to
establish publication by Mr. Nielson, a necessary element of a defamation claim, her first cause
I
of action must be dismissed a,> a i;.n-r
,i- •
,.
-.« U\ Hi, , iciil ll,e
claim relies on Mr. Nielson \s report.
II.

MS. ZOUMADAKIS* SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INTENTIONAL
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS MUST BE DISMISSED AS A
MATTER OF LAW
Ms. Zoumadakis" second cause of action purports to SUM . a * ...

i :-

•f • motional distress against all defendants. This claim must be dismissed because Ms.
Zoumadakis fails to state a claim under Utah law.
111 " I 111 .11' 1 r 11111 (-i 11

11 i (11»1111 111 (1 i ction of emotional distress under Utah law, a plaintiff

must show:
(a) that the defendant engaged in some conduct toward the plaintiff considered
outrageous and intolerable in that it offends the generally accepted standards
of decency and morality (b) with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress
or where any reasonable person would have known that such would result,
and (c)that severe emotional distress resulted as a direct result of the
defendant's conduct.

6
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Ankers v. Rodman, 995 F.Supp. 1329, 1335 (D. Utah 1997) quoting Russell v. Thomson
i

Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 905 (I Itah 1992),,, Disn iissal < if i h iii i lfi)i intc :ntic >n; \\ ii rlln tion
of emotional distress on a Rule 12 motion is appropriate if all the elements of the tort are not
i

alleged or if the alleged conduct on which the claim is based does not rise to UK; ie\ ,i . :
outragrousnrss ivun|

j

under Utah law. Boisjoly, 706 F.Supp. 795, 801-02 (D. Utah 1988).

Here, dismissal of Ms. Zoumadakis' intentional infliction claim is appropriate because as
does not i ise to the level of

outrageousness required under Utah law. Whether the alleged conduct at issue may reasonably
be regarded-:. ^ . •. •

^^-n.Mi> a ;

Ankers, 995 F.Supp. at MIS

v-> • «••

..

. t.

I he burden of proving outrageous conduct is a heavy one, and

liability may be imposed uui, AIICIC UIL ^;hui^; ^

..A-L.'-I./,

civilized community." Retherford v. AT & T Communications,

.*M

I-

a

844 P.2d 949, 977-78, n.19 (Utah

1992). Conduct which simply constitutes an insult or indignity is not actionable.
i

>

uiik;

f-K

*f • defendants Dr. Mason and Ms. Smith made untrue

allegations to Ms. Zoumadakis' supervisor regarding her work performance in providing services
lo thni patirnh, SHI li illnnliims rvrn ill" In nr h m l h lisrlutln level of "atrocious and utterly
intolerable" behavior as required to establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional

defendant as an engineer and was involved in the manufacturing of certain parts used in Space
Shuttle Challenger. After tlle Challenger explodeu, PLUULH i,

.i:.anuoi

a huei.il

commission investigating the incident. Plaintiff claimed that in connection with that
investigation, his employer discredited him, threatened his job and removed him from the

7
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investigation of the accident. Again, the court found that under Utah law, such conduct, while
not laudable or desirable behavior, was not "so outrageous in character, and so extrenle in
-} bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and

degiv^ : . ! , • • . '

utterly intolerable in a civilized society." Id at 802. See also Ankers, 995 F. Supp. at 1 .oOo /
(pi..-;

;i|»,

•

».'!.*.•

•

'

.fi." : I, ril*.. ill Association game

and the television audience as a matter of law was not sufficiently outrageously to support a

J

claim for intentional miuciiv?.. •: emo;:-

• uisuess).

Taking Ms. Zoumadakis' allegations as true, that employees and contractors of Uintah
Basin complained to Ms. Zoumadakis' supervisor regarding na pci unman
simph

;

ntiite conduct that is so outrageous and extreme "as to go beyond all

possible bounds of decency" and be considered "atrocious," Ms Zoumadakis' second cause of

ill

MS. ZOUMADAKIS THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR TORTIOUS
INTERFERENCE WITH EMPLOYMENT MlJST K F DISMISSED
In support of her third cause of action for tortious interference with employment, Ms.

Zoumadakis alleges that the false allegations that are the subjeci <,>i nci aeiainauo;
hci In iiiiiiutf !i HI ,^ s .in initial matter, while Ms. Zoumadakis entitles her claim one of tortious
interference with "employment/' such a claim does not exist under Utah law. Ms. Zoumadakis'
M

.

• !1Ji; .n:--rfiTiMuv witl; contract within the employment setting.

To establish a claim for interference with conliacL a parl> must show (1) that the defendant
intentionally interfeu

M im •.-Mas.^.

purpose or for an improper means; (3) causing damage to plaintiff. St. Benedict 'v Development

8
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Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 1 lM, 2C»o (I 'tali 1WI); /« >/<?// Furniture & Carpet Co. v.
horn, 657 P.2d 293 (I Jtah 1982); see also Milatz v .l-ntu / . a , /.-., . i"v
51

'<

F

(

'

;

.. App. i

.v/v,

I:AI>

• -iiious interference with employment relationship requires the
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alleged are actions by parties to the relationship, which as a matter of law, cannot constitute
interference with contract.
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Commercial Finance Corp., 858 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Utah App. Iv^Jj.
Here, Ms. Zoumadakis does not plead either that defendants intended to interfere with her
einplo), nient i elatioi iship oi facts demonstrating that defendants knew interference would be the
substantially certain and necessary consequence of their allegedly wrongful actions. Rather, Ms.
Zoiii nadakis pleads oi lih 1:1 itat 1 lei termii latioi i < ( "ra s in fa ;:t tl is i ssi ilt • : i theii acts ai id hei claii i i for
intentional interference must be dismissed.
B. '
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Only Interference Alleged Is By Parties to The Contract

As noted above, Ms. Zoumadakis' claim of interference with contract fails because she
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Leigh Furniture, "it is well settled that one party to a contract cannot be liable for the tort of
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interference with contract for inducing a breach by himself or the other contracting party." 657
P.2d at 301. Ms. Zoumadakis has alleged onL Uiat t miai, 1U;.... .mu IL> einpio>ees aim agents,
interfered with her employment relationship with Uintah Basin. Such allegations are
insufficient to establish her claim and it must be dismissed.
CONCI
For the reasons stated above, Ms. Zoumadakis' complaint should be dismissed in its

DATED this Z 3

day of January, 2004.

£ME.ROBERTS & OWEN LLP
BLAINEJTBENARD
CAROLYN COX
BRITTANY J. NELSON
299 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2263
Attorneys for Defendants

Because a corporation can only act through its employees and agents, their acts must be
considered the acts of the entity.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this
day of January, 2004, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS was served by
U.S. mail, postage prepaid, as follows:
JAYL.KESSLER
9117 West 2700 South #A
Magna, UT 84044
Attorney for Plaintiff
DATED this

#160788 vl

day of January, 2004.

FEB f 8; 2004
EE

Jay L. Kessler (8550)
KESSLER LAW OFFICE
Attorney for Meiany Zoumadakis
9117 West 2700 South, #A
Magna, Utah 84044
Telephone: (801) 252-1400
Facsimile: (801) 252-1401

- CLERK
DEPUTY

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MELANY ZOUMADAKIS,
Plaintiff.

OBJECTION TO MOTION
TO DISMISS

v.
UNTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER, INC., and
individuals DR. MARK MASON, LLOYD
NIELSON, CAROLYN SMITH, and JOHN
DOES 1-10.
Defendants.

Judge JR Anderson
Case No. 030800083

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, by and through counsel undersigned, and objects to
the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, as follows:
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Utah Supreme Court has heid, "When reviewing the propriety of granting a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, we
accept as true all material allegations contained in the complaint and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 811 P.2d
194,196 (Utah 1991).

ARGUMENT
1. MS. ZOUMADAKIS' HAS A VIABLE CAUSE OF ACTION IN DEFAMATION
AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS
The elements for a claim of defamation are as outlined in Defendants
Memorandum. They are:
A) That Defendants published statements concerning Plaintiff.
The Plaintiff states in her Complaint that Defendants Carolyn Smith and Dr. Mark
Mason published falsehoods about the Plaintiffs work history. The Plaintiff specifically
states:
8. The specific complaints by Mason included that the Plaintiff was telling
patients that Mason was ordering wrong things, that Mason was giving
improper care, and that the Plaintiff smelled of alcohol as complained of
by an unsolicited patient.
9. According to information and belief, Defendant Smith (hereinafter
Smith), also misrepresented to Mason that the Plaintiff was questioning
his care. (See Complaint-paras 8 & 9).
The Plaintiff also specifically states in her Complaint that Defendant Nielson

published:
18. Nielsen's disciplinary report incorrectly states that the Plaintiff has
been warned on many occasions regarding her behavior, when in reality,
the Plaintiff has had an exemplary work history. (See Complaint-para 18).
Not only were specific statements published by the Defendants as properly pled,
but the statements were pled with particularity. Specifically the untruths as to how the
Plaintiff took care of her patients; how she took care of herself (i.e. the alcohol breath
statement); that the Plaintiff questioned the doctor's care; and that untruths were written
in her employment history.
The above-listed statements are specific enough in order for the Defendants to
formulate a defense.
2

Also, the Plaintiff states in her Complaint that she was told about the aforesaid
untruths in the office of Defendant Nielson on September 19, 2003. The employment
history untruths would need to be turned over in discovery to ascertain exactly when
and where those untruths took place.
B) Such statements were false, defamatory and any privilege is rebuffed by
Defendants' malice.
The Plaintiff clearly rebuffs the statements published by the Defendants. The
Complaint outlines that the Defendants have ruined the Plaintiffs life through the
defamatory statements.
Further, it is curious that the Defendants do not deny that their statements were
untrue. Instead the Defendants invoke a qualified privilege that the statements that
were made are the subject of a common interest between Dr. Mason, Ms. Smith, and
Mr. Nielson to protect the welfare of the patients. Unfortunately, the statements were
untrue, and used to terminate Ms. Zoumadakis* employment for many malicious
reasons, such as:
a. Defendant Mason and Smith published untruths about the Plaintiff
because they were concerned about the Plaintiffs meticulous records and zealous
desire to follow all state laws and regulations regarding treatment and care for patients.
Although the Plaintiff did not attempt to "blow a whistle" on the behaviors of Smith and
Mason, it became clear that they would try and do anything to remove the Plaintiff from
her job; even publish untruths. (See Exhibit A-Affidavit of Melany Zoumadakis).
b. It is the Plaintiffs belief that Defendant Nielson wanted the Plaintiff
removed from her job because she was a threat to his job. Shortly before Mr. Nielson
3

threatened to terminate the Plaintiff, Ms. Zoumadakis made the suggestion that

a

wound-care unit could be put into one of the conference rooms, and that if it would help
she could talk to the administrators about it. My Nielson became irate and told the
Plaintiff that "He would handle if. (See Exhibit A-Affidavit of Melany Zoumadakis).
Also, when the staff at the Medical Center found out what had taken place
with the PlaintifTs termination, they made a card in support of her. According to workers
who desire to remain anonymous, Mr. Nielson grabbed the card away, destroyed it, and
yelled at the employees who drafted and signed it (See Exhibit A-Affidavit of Melany
Zoumadakis).
One of the employees specifically told Ms. Zoumadakis that he told Mr.
Nielson that "He would not participate in blackballing her [the Plaintiff]." Insinuating that
this is exactly what Mr. Nielson was trying to do. (See Exhibit A-Affidavit of Melany
Zoumadakis).
Ms. Zoumadakis' exemplary record and many supporters (as evidenced by many
community petitions to reinstate her) show that Mr. Nielson fired Ms. Zoumadakis and
published a fraudulent and/or libelous employment history of her to "blackball her" for
his own employment comfort.
C) As outlined above the Plaintiff does indeed allege that Mr. Nielson
published his untruths for the purpose of terminating the Plaintiff.
Not only did Defendant Nielson publish his untruths about the Plaintiff in her
employment file, but he wrongfully, and with the malicious intent to defame, tell Utah
Workforce Services that the Plaintiff quit from her job rather than her being wrongfully
terminated. (See Exhibit A-Affidavit of Melany Zoumadakis).
4

This information will need to be obtained through discovery. As such a Motion to
Dismiss is premature at this stage.
2. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IS A VIABLE CAUSE OF
ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS.
The Plaintiff agrees that IIED may be imposed if the conduct of the tortfeasor is
"atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Retherford v. AT&T
Communications. 844 P.2d 949. 977-78 (Utah 1992).
Clearly the conduct of the Defendants rises to the level of IIED. The Defendants
rely upon Boisjoly v. Morton ThiokolT lnc.T 706 F.Supp. 795 (D. Utah 1988) to support
their position that Ms. Zoumadakis was not sufficiently inflicted with enough intention
emotional distress to warrant a cause of action. Boisjoly, at 801-02.
Boisjoly is distinguished from the present case because the untruths did not cost
the Boisjoly Plaintiff his job. He was just moved to a different position. In Ms.
Zoumadakis' case, she was terminated because of published untruths.
It is the extra malicious step of terminating the job Ms. Zoumadakis loved and
performed so well for more than 13 years which makes the Defendants' actions
"atrocious and utterly intolerable".
3. MS, ZOUMADAKIS WAS A THIRTEEN YEAR AT-WILL EMPLOYEE EXCEPT FOR
THE EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK AGREEMENT WHICH WAS BREACHED DUE TO
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT.
Although Ms. Zoumadakis cannot show a specific contract for work, she was a
long-term employee who considered her job secure. Her employee handbook provided
for a grievance procedure which was breached by Defendant Nielson. (See Exhibit
5

B-Grievance Procedure).
The procedure allowed for a meeting with two administrators regarding the
specific grievance. After the termination, and within the five day window to file, Ms.
Zoumadakis tendered the grievance to Defendant Medical Center, which was
summarily ignored. As such it was a breach of an employee/employer contract due to
the tortious interference of the Defendants. (See Exhibit C-Formal Notice of Grievance
Letter).
Further discovery will evidence the breach of employment contract and the
tortious interference thereof.
CONCLUSION
A period of time to conduct discovery is necessary to determine if the Complaint
should be amended, and to what degree. The Utah Supreme Court held, "Utah,
however has adopted liberalized pleading rules. These rules allow parties to present
any legitimate claims they have relating to their dispute, subject to the requirement that
their adversary have fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a
general indication of the type of litigation involved."
The Plaintiff respectfully requests that a period of discovery be allowed to
determine if the pending Motion to Dismiss has merit, and that the pleadings be allowed
to be amended if necessary.
DATED this 1*7 day of February, 2004.
KESSLER LAW OFFICE

y^—
J/ay l/Kessler, attorney for Plaintiff

:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this P
day of February, 2004,1 sent via hand-delivery or First
Class United States Mail a copy of the foregoing Objection to Motion to Dismiss to the
following:
Carolyn Cox, Esq.
Holme Roberts & Owen LLP
299 S. Main Street
Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2263
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Jay L. Kessler (8550)
KESSLER LAW OFFICE
Attorney for Melany Zoumadakis
9117 West 2700 South, #A
Magna, Utah 84044
Telephone: (801) 252-1400
Facsimile: (801) 252-1401
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MELANY ZOUMADAKIS,
Plaintiff.

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
OBJECTION TO MOTION
TO DISMISS

UNTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER, INC., and
individuals DR. MARK MASON, LLOYD
NIELSON, CAROLYN SMITH, and JOHN
DOES 1-10.
Defendants.

Judge JR Anderson
Case No. 030800083

STATE OF UTAH )
) ss
County of Salt Lake)
I, Melany Zoumadakis, being first duly sworn upon her oath, deposes and attests as
follows:
1. That I am an adult and am competent and able to attest to the following
matters from personal knowledge and experience.
2. That I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action.
3. That I was terminated from my job Uintah Basin Medical Center, Inc. due to
the malicious defamation of the Defendants, specifically due to the following behaviors:

a. Defendant Mason and Smith published untruths about me because
they were concerned about my meticulous records and zealous desire to follow all state
laws and regulations regarding treatment and care for patients. Although the I did not
attempt to "blow a whistle" on the behaviors of Smith and Mason, it became clear that
they would try and do anything to remove me from my job; even publish untruths.
b. It is my belief that Defendant Nielson wanted me removed from my job
because he believed that I was a threat to his job. Shortly before Mr. Nielson
threatened to terminate me, I made the suggestion that a wound-care unit could be put
into one of the conference rooms, and that if it would help I would talk to the
administrators about it. My Nielson became irate and told me that "He would handle it".
Also, when the staff at the Medical Center found out what had taken place
with my termination, they made a card in support of me. According to workers who
desire to remain anonymous, Mr. Nielson grabbed the card away, destroyed it, and
yelled at the employee who drafted it.
One of the other employees specifically told me that he told Mr. Nielson
that "He would not participate in blackballing me." Insinuating that this is exactly what
Mr. Nielson was trying to do.
4. Also, when I applied for unemployment, Mr. Nielson gave an untrue statement
of my work history to the Dept. of Workforce Services to try and deny me benefits.
5. That If called upon to testify in this matter I would affirm the above written
statements.
Further affiant saith not.
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DATED thfc J j L day of February, 2004.
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©TATE OF UTAH

)
86

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
Melany Zoumadakis, on tht» U day of February, 2004, being first duly
sworn and under oath, depose* and says that she i* tha Ptaintfff in the above-entitled
action; that she has read the foregoing document and understands the oontente

JAY
JAY i

911

H

•"^JSLEP
South #A
64044

-S>^C

iTHOFS&RVJOg

I hereby certHy that on this M.. day of February, 2004,1 sent via First Class
United States Mai a copy of theforegoingAffidavit in Support of Objection to Motion to
Dismiss to the foHwring:
Carolyn Cox, Esq.
Holme Roberts & Owen LLP
299 S. Main Street
Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.2263
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GRIEVANCE P R 0 C E D U S E / 4 L T E R N A W E DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
Uintah Basin Medical Center is firmly committed that undisclosed
problems will remain unresolved, and eventually lead to a decay of
work relationships, dissatisfaction m working coBC&tions, and a
decline in productivity. Therefore, Uintah Basin Medical Center
has established a grievance procedure to solve problems as quickly
and fairly as possible. The grievance procedure should not be
interpreted as anything more than a method of solving problems
before they reach damaging proportions.
Eligibility:
Employees eligible to grieve under the grievance procedure are
Full-Time Regular employees, Part-Time Regular employees and
PRN employees. Volunteers and employees who voluntarily
terminate employment are ineligible to grieve under the grievance
procedure.
Gubtelixies:
Employees who seekiesolutLon of employment situations by using
the grievance procedure ate assured that they will not be subject to
discrimination, retaliation, or be penalized in any way for their use
of the following procedures.
An employee having a problem, complaint, or dispute
should make every effort to resolve the matter through
discussion with the immediate supervisor. An employee
should use diligence in trying to work any problems out
with their supervisor. Only after measurable effect feas
been made should an employee move on to the other steps
If the employee's concern is not resolved to ths employee* s
satisfaction through step 3U the employee may file a written
appeal tO thC DirOCtW of Human Resources within five (5)
43
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EXHIBIT C

KESSLER LAW OFFICE
JAY L. KESSLER, ATTORNEY
3338 Sowth 900 Beat
Suite #120
eaK Lake CHy, Utah 8 4 t « *

T«to|»h©ne:<W1)4«7-37*0
Fscsim&s: (801) 497-3704

September 24,2003
Uifflah Basin Medical Center, Inc.
Director of Human Resource*
250 West 300 Norm 75-2
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
Re:

Zoumadakis v. Uintah Basin Medical Canter. Imx, Uoyd Neiten.
Dr. Mason, e t al.
Grievance totter

Deer Director of Human Resource*,!
I have bean retained by Melany ZoumadaKle to rectify the Inappropriate
termination of her employment. Let this letter to myformatnotice of our
grtevance regarding the inappropriateneas and manner In which aha was
terminated.
Me. Zoumadafcls vshementty refute* the charges against her. She
feels as though virtually no effort was made to corroborate these charges, The
letter styled 'Ggrrtfcflye, DififiWinav AQtrPP' which «ne was auppoaed to sign,
does not evidence anything she has done wrong except for what Or, Mason
afleges, which we dispute.
This letter is the only notice you wffi receive regarding our depute with the
manner Ms. Zoumedakis was terminated. We wHf settfe for nothing short of the
following:
1. Anirr«T!edlsterek)sl8tem®rittohefiot>;
2. Reimbursement for all back wage© she hae tost;
3. A written apology on behalf of Ihe Medical Center; and,
4. Ro^ibunt^^dntofaflm^l^lbilteahehaftirM^rreddsjiitoth*
emotional distress she has been subjected to.

It fs my belief that this matter can be settled amicably, but it I do not hear from
yourself or your attorney by September 30,2003, by 4.30 P.M., we will personally
serve you with a Complaint filed In the Eighth Judicial District Court. Following

1

the fHing in the court, and service of the same to you, you wi« have twenty days
to file an answer.
The District Court Complaint wilt be Mparate from a discrimination claim
filed concurrently wfth the local office of the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission.
If you have any questions please do not hesitate to call.
Sincerely,

L Kessler

cc: M. Zoumadakis
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HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP
Blaine J. Benard, #5661
Carolyn Cox, #4816
299 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2263
Telephone: (801) 323-5800
Facsimile: (801) 521-9639
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF DUCHESNE
MELANY ZOUMADAKIS,
Plaintiff

REPLY MEMORANDUM
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS

v.

Case No. 030800083

UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER, INC.,
and individuals DR. MARK MASON,
LLOYD NIELSON, CAROLYN SMITH, and
JOHN DOES 1-10,

Judge John R. Anderson
HEARING REQUESTED

Defendant

Defendants Uintah Basin Medical Center, Inc., Dr. Mark Mason, Lloyd Nielson and
Carolyn Smith, by their counsel, respectfully submit this Reply Memorandum in Support of their
Motion to Dismiss the complaint of plaintiff Melany Zoumadakis. For the reasons stated below
and in defendants' initial Memorandum in Support dated January 23, 2004 ("Memo, in
Support"), plaintiffs complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and should
be dismissed, in its entirety, with prejudic!^.
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ARGUMENT
I.

ZOUMADAKIS' FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DEFAMATION SHOULD BE
DISMISSED
A.

Zoumadakis' Defamation Claim Is Not Pled With Adequate Particularity

Defendants first seek dismissal of Zoumadakis' defamation claim on the grounds it is not
pled with adequate particularity. In response, Zoumadakis argues that she adequately pled the
content of the allegedly defamatory statements and therefore has met her particularity burden.
However, even assuming Zoumandakis adequately pled the content of the alleged statements, to
meet her burden of pleading with particularity, Zoumadakis must also allege when, where and to
whom the alleged defamatory statement was made. Boisjoly v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 706 F.Supp
795, 800 (D. Utah 1988).1 Zoumadakis has not pled this additional information with respect to
the alleged defamatory statements and her first cause of action must therefore be dismissed.
B.

Zoumadakis' Defamation Claim Must Be Dismissed Because Even Assuming
She Met Particularity Requirements, The Alleged Defamatory Statements
Are Subject To A Qualified Privilege

As set forth in defendants' initial Memo, in Support, even assuming Zoumadakis pled her
defamation claim with adequate particularity, her claim must still be dismissed because the
defamatory statements alleged are subject to a qualified privilege. In response, Zoumadakis does
not dispute the common interest between the defendants giving rise to the privilege, but rather
argues that the privilege does not apply for several reasons. First, Zoumadakis suggests that the
1

In her reply, Zoumadakis argues that she meets this requirement because her Complaint
identifies when she learned of the alleged defamatory statement. However, Zoumadakis must
identify when, where and to whom the alleged defamatory statements were made, not when she
learned about the statements.

2
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qualified privilege does not apply because the alleged defamatory statements are untrue.
However, application of the qualified privilege does not rest on the truth of the alleged
defamatory statements. Rather, the privilege blocks liability even though the statements are in
fact false. Brehany v. Nordstrom, 812 P.2d 49, 58-59 (Utah 1991).
Based on an affidavit submitted with her Objection to the Motion to Dismiss,
Zoumadakis also asserts that the statements were made for malicious reasons, including that
defendants Mason and Smith were concerned about Zoumadakis' meticulous records and her
desire to follow all state laws and regulations regarding patient treatment and care; and that
defendant Nielson wanted to terminate plaintiff because she was a threat to his job. As an initial
matter, Zoumadakis' assertions in opposition to defendants' motion are not raised in the
Complaint, but were made only in response to this motion. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion addresses
the sufficiency of the allegations contained in the complaint. Zoumadakis cannot supply missing
elements of her complaint by way of a self serving affidavit filed in response to a motion to
dismiss. See e.g. Nester v. Bank One Corp., 244 F.Supp. 1344, 1346 (D. Ut. 2002) (It is
inappropriate to consider an affidavit from plaintiff in connection with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss since the sufficiency of the complaint is the only issue before the court).
Moreover, as Zoumadakis acknowledges, her new affidavit is not based on her own
knowledge but rather on hearsay. Thus, her affidavit is defective and cannot provide a basis for
denying defendants'motion.

3
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As set forth in defendants' initial Memo, in Support, the alleged defamatory statements
are privileged as a matter of law and Zoumadakis' defamation claim therefore must be
dismissed.
C.

Zoumadakis' Defamation Claim Must Be Dismissed As Against Defendant
Nielson for Lack of Publication

As set forth in defendants' initial Memo, in Support, Zoumadakis' defamation claim must
be dismissed as against defendant Nielson for the additional reason that his alleged defamatory
statements were not published to a third party. In her objection, Zoumadakis does not dispute
that Nielson's alleged defamatory statements were not published to a third party. However,
Zoumadakis seeks to avoid dismissal of her claim through a new allegation that Nielson told
Utah Workforce Services that Zoumadakis quit her job, rather than saying she was wrongfully
terminated. Once again, Zoumadakis can not rectify deficiencies in her Complaint through
statements and assertions not contained in the Complaint.
In addition, and more importantly, Nielson's statement to workforce services that
Zoumadakis quit her employment is simply not defamatory. To constitute defamation, a
statement must impeach an individual's honesty, integrity, virtue or reputation, and thereby
expose the individual to public hatred, contempt or ridicule. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872
P.2d. 999, 1008 (Utah 1994). Simply stating that a person quit their job, even if untrue, does not
constitute defamation as a matter of law. Zoumadakis' defamation claim must therefore be
dismissed.
IL

ZOUMADAKIS' SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INTENTIONAL
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS SHOULD BE DISMISSED

4
#162739 vl

Defendants seek dismissal of Zoumadakis' second cause of action alleging intentional
infliction of emotional distress on the grounds that as a matter of law, the conduct on which her
claim is based (Dr. Mason's and Smith's allegedly untrue statements regarding Zoumadakis'
work performance, and Nielson's documentation of the same) does not rise to the level of
outrageousness necessary to state a claim under Utah law. Boisjoly, 706 F. Supp. at 801-02
(plaintiffs allegations that his employer discredited him, threatened his job and removed him
from the investigation of NASA accident did not rise to outrageousness necessary to state a
claim under Utah law). In response, Zoumadakis attempts to distinguish the Boisjoly case and
argues that here defendants' conduct is more outrageous because she was ultimately terminated.
However, Utah courts have consistently rejected claims for intentional infliction that arise out of
the alleged wrongful termination of an employee.
In Larson v. Sysco Corp., 161 P.2d 557 (Utah 1989), plaintiff claimed he had been
wrongfully terminated, and in addition to a claim for breach of contract, sought recovery for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court affirmed the lower court's grant of
summary judgment on plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, stating:
that "[wjhile" termination can be an emotionally distressing event in one's life, mere termination
alone does not constitute the intentional infliction of emotional distress." Id. at 561.
Similarly, in Sperber v. Galigher Ash, 747 P.2d 1045 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme
Court held that plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of an
alleged wrongful termination was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim under Utah law.
As in Larson, the Court found that mere discharge from employment, even where plaintiff
5
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claimed the employer had given an incorrect reason for termination, did not state a claim for
intentional infliction as a matter of law. The Court noted that while every employee who
contests a termination decision suffers some emotional anguish as a result of the termination,
such distress is simply insufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
absent facts that would independently support such a claim. Id. at 1028-1029. See also,
Gudenkaufv. Stauffer Comm., Inc., 922 F.Supp. 461, 464 (D.Kan. 1996) (termination for
allegedly discriminatory reasons is insufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress); Bunker v. City ofOlathe, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3583 (D.Kan. 2001)
(demotion and other adverse employment actions for allegedly wrongful reasons is insufficient to
state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
Here, Zoumadakis essentially alleges that defendants should not have terminated her
employment and the reasons proffered were incorrect. Such allegations, even if true, do not state
a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Her second cause of action should be
dismissed with prejudice.
IIL

ZOUMADAKIS5 CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH
CONTRACT MUST BE DISMISSED
Defendants seek dismissal of Zoumadakis' third cause of action for interference with

contract for two reasons: 1) she does not allege, nor can she, that she had a valid contractual
relationship with which the defendants interfered, the first element of a claim for interference
with contract; and 2) she alleges only interference by parties to the contracts or their employees
and agents. With respect to the first basis for dismissal, Zoumadakis does not dispute that she

6
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did not have an employment agreement and in fact acknowledges that she was an at will
employee . Zoumadakis' Objection to Motion to Dismiss at 5. As an at will employee,
Zoumadakis did not have a valid enforceable employment contract with which defendants could
interfere. See Defendants' initial Memo, in Support at 8-9. In addition, as she does not dispute,
Zoumadakis alleges only wrongful actions on the part of defendants, and does not allege that
defendants undertook those acts in an intentional attempt to interfere with her contractual
relationship. In the absence of such allegations, her claim fails. See Defendants' initial Memo,
in Support at 10.
More importantly, even if Zoumadakis had or could allege a valid enforceable contract
with which defendants intentionally interfered, as set forth in defendants' initial Memo, in
Support, she alleges only interference by Uintah Basin or its employees and agents acting on its
behalf. One party to the contract cannot be liable for the tort of interference with contract. Leigh
Furniture & Carpet Co. v. horn, 657 P.2d 293, 301 (Utah 1982). Zoumadakis fails to even
address this argument, much less provide contrary authority. Her third cause of action for
interference with contract must therefore be dismissed.

2

Zoumadakis does suggest that she was denied a grievance procedure to which she was
entitled. While defendants dispute Zoumadakis' assertions, such assertions cannot defeat this
motion to dismiss because they are not raised in the complaint. See above at 3. In addition, even
if Zoumadakis' assertions had been set forth in her complaint and Zoumadakis could
demonstrate that the grievance procedure was a valid contractual right, her claim would still fail
because the alleged acts of interference were by a party to the contract, i.e., Uintah Basin or
others acting on its behalf. See below at 7.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in defendants' initial Memo, in Support, Zoumadakis'
Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety, with prejudice.
DATED this d ^

day of February, 2004.

HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP
CAROLYN COX
299 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2263
Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this 2 ^ day of February, 2004, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS was served by U.S. mail, postage prepaid, as follows:
Jay L. Kessler
9117 West 2700 South #A
Magna, Utah 84044
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DISTRICT COURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH

MAY 2 h 20M
JOAH&1E MoKEE, CLERK

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MELANY ZOUMADAKIS,

3Y

^ ^ f t — DEPUTY

RULING

Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 030800083
UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER
et al., Defenc ants.

Judge John R. Anderson

The Court having received defendants' Motion to Dismiss, plaintiffs Memorandum in
Opposition, defendant's Reply, having received oral argument, having reviewed the pleadings
and being otherwise fully informed, enters the following:
I

This case involves Ms. Zoumadakis, who was employed by Uintah Basin Medical Center
("UBMC") as a home health care nurse and Dr. Mark Mason (employed by UBMC), Carolyn
Smith (doctor Mason's medical assistant), and Mr. Lloyd Nielson (director of home health care).
Summarily, the plaintiff claims defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
interference with contract in the employment setting. The dispute revolves around 1) statements
made by Ms. Smith to Dr. Mason that Plaintiff had questioned Dr. Mason's care of his patients;
2) complaints by Dr. Mason to Mr. Nielson that Plaintiff had been complaining of his care to the
patients and a complaint by a patient that Plaintiff smelled of alcohol; and 3) Mr. Nielson's
written disciplinary report addressing the above complaints.
Plaintiffs claim for defamation was not pled with particularity as required. The general
statements referred to in the Complaint do not inform defendants when, where and to whom the
alleged defamatory statements were made. Even if the allegations are sufficient, they are subject
to a qualified privilege, as Dr. Mason, Ms. Smith, and Mr. Nielson all share a common interest
and the statements were made to protect a legitimate interest of the publisher. See Brehany v.
Nordstrom, 812 P.2d 49, 59 (Utah 1991). Finally, Plaintiff did not allege that Mr. Nielson
published the disciplinary report to any third party who read and understood the statements.
Plaintiff attempts to rebuff the privilege by claiming the statements were untrue. However, the
privilege is not defeated even if the statements were false. Plaintiff submits an affidavit in which
she raises new information not raised in her complaint, such as, defendants were acting out in
alleged retribution, or that Mr. Nielson made statements to a third party. Because the 12(b)
motion's focus is on the sufficiency of the complaint, it is inappropriate to consider this affidavit,
despite the affidavit being defective as based on hearsay.
Similarly, plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is insufficient,

as the alleged conduct does not rise to the level required by Utah law, i.e., going "beyond all
bounds of decency, and . . . . atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society." Boisjoly v.
Morton Thiokol Inc., 706 F. Supp 795, 802 (D. Utah 1988). Defendant has provided ample case
law that indicates mere termination is not sufficient to constitute outrageous conduct as required
for a valid intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
Finally, Plaintiffs claim for interference with employment contract is fatally flawed.
Plaintiff has shown no valid enforceable employment with which to interfere. Plaintiff was an
at-will employee. Even if plaintiff could show a valid enforceable contract, which as noted
above she cannot, Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. horn, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982) indicates
one party to the contract cannot be liable for interference for inducing a breach by himself or by
the other party. Here, all of Defendants are parties to the contract, either directly or as UBMC's
employees or agents. As such, they cannot be liable for interference. In response, Plaintiff refers
to the grievance procedure provided for in the employee handbook, and claims she was denied
the process, therefore Defendants interfered with her employment. However, as stated above, she
does not allege anybody other than parties to the contract interfered, and therefore, Defendants
cannot be held liable under a claim for interference of contract.
Based upon the above, it is hereby ORDERED that defendants' Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED.
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Dated this Pi

day of May, 2004

. Anderson, District Court Judge
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